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COASE THEOREM SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION
The modern economic literature on competitive equilibrium asserts
and proves that if consumers and producers face limited resources, if
formal and free markets exist for all commodities and items of value
taken individually or grouped by interdependence, and if initial
endowments do not preclude anyone from any market, then competi-
tive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.' That is, no one can be made
better off without simultaneously making someone else worse off,
given initial endowments of all parties. Where do property rights
belong in such a world? They must be costless instruments which
define exactly in all dimensions, the nature of entitlement for initial
wealth and exchanged goods, i.e., the extent of exclusiveness of
ownership and use of all non-free resources. Property rights are
thereby restrictions on the competitive allocation of resources.
Coase in his famous paper on social costs asserted that given the
initial "delimitation of rights . . . the ultimate result (which maxi-
mizes the value of production) is independent of . . . [the choice of a
liability or non-liability rule] . . . if the pricing system is assured to
work without cost." 2 Calabresi recently restated the Coase "theorem"
more succinctly as follows: "The same allocation of resources will
come about regardless of which of two joint cost users is initially
charged with the cost, in other words, regardless of liability rules." 3
Of course, Calabresi also presumed that the pricing system per se
operated without cost. In addition, Calabresi reiterated the Coase
conclusion that liability rules do not influence the efficient allocation
1. For a summary of this work, see K. J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity:
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation, in The Analysis and
Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, Subcomm. on Economy in Government,
Joint Economic Comm., U.S. Congress, (1969).
2. Coase, 3 The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law and Economics, 8 (1960).
3. Calabresi, Transactions Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.
of L. & Econ. 67 (1968).
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of resources in either the short run or long run when all secondary
effects are accounted for.4
Coase in effect asserted that the selection of a liability or
non-liability rule had no effect on efficient resource allocation. The
choice of one of the rules was thereby redundant to the proper
functioning of markets. This conclusion has had a profound influence
on the thinking of at least a generation of economists and led to a
continuing debate on the role and influence of legal doctrines on the
efficiency of private negotiation. It is the central purpose of this
symposium issue to draw together the various philosophical, methodo-
logical, and factual arguments, both pro and con, on both the
conceptual validity and practical implications of the Coase theorem.
Rather than reiterating the multiple arguments as they emerged
during the 1960's and early 1970's, we have attempted to assemble a
collection of research papers that catalogue these controversies but
also extend the focus, breadth, and understanding of the relationships
among economic efficiency, social equity, and alternative configura-
tions of legal rights. Before proceeding to the individual papers, it
appears useful to list some of the more obvious and simple conceptual
difficulties inherent in the Coase theorem.
The Coase analysis introduces a perturbation into an otherwise
perfect economic system and then demonstrates that regardless of the
legal rule, the system will regain its perfection. By perturbation, it is
meant a change in relationship between two or more parties.
Examples of such perturbations can be obtained from Coase: a) the
cattle that stray onto a neighboring corn field; b) the doctor who
opens a new room adjacent to a noisy factory. In each of these and
other examples considered by Coase, there is a perturbation in the
relationship between two parties unaccounted for in earlier ex-
changes. A logical inconsistency may be inherent because these
perturbations would not occur in a competitive system with zero
transactions or information-contracting-policing costs. They would be
known and bargained for prior to their occurence irrespective of the
type of liability rule selected. Coase, by introducing a perturbation,
thereby negates one of the assumptions necessary for asserting that
the allocation of resources will be efficient regardless of liability rules
in both the short and long run, namely complete, perfect, and costless
information. 5 A perturbation occurs which is not known in advance,
4. Coase, supra note 2, at 68. Coase states "the long-run equilibrium position . . . is the
same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop damage brought about by
his cattle."
5. In the short run, bargaining solutions with or without a liability rule have been shown to
be Pareto efficient. However, a number of writers including Calabresi, and indirectly Bramhall
and Mills have raised questions as to the conclusion by Coase that long run allocation of
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i.e., information is lacking; but there is complete information at zero
cost for all future potential exchanges. 6 If Coase was not assuming a
perturbation, his theorem compresses to the well-known classical
economic result that 1) perfectly competitive bargaining yields an
efficient allocation of resources and 2) liability or non-liability rules
are nothing more than one legal dimension delimiting initial endow-
ments.
A second problem of consistency in the Coase proposition is that if
liability rules are one component defining initial endowments of all
consumers and producers, how can they be variables in establishing a
competitive efficient allocation? In other words, if adoption of
liability rather than non-liability rule for externalities defines initial
endowments, it is doubtful that the allocation of goods between
parties would be the same, unless liability per se does not influence
wealth. If it does, then each individual's wealth would be different
depending whether liabilty was or was not adopted. If differences in
initial endowments induced different allocations of resources through,
say, variations in demand for goods by different parties, then the
allocation of resources clearly would not be the same as with
non-liability. In defense of Coase, one can assert that even if liability
rules did influence wealth, given a particular liability rule, a
competitive equilibrium identified as Pareto efficiency would exist for
each type of liability rule. 7 The question then becomes one of
selecting the "best" of the Pareto-efficient allocations of resources and
the rule on liability that yields the "best" ethical allocation.
A third major problem with the Coase analysis is the implicit
recognition of what Arrow calls the "universality" of markets with
zero transactions costs, i.e., competitive markets for anything of value
that do not cost anything to operate, without recognizing that a
resources will be the same regardless of liability rules. As was noted earlier, Calabresi recently
reversed his opinion and concluded that long run as well as short run resource allocation would
be the same. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 730 1965; Bramhall & Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and
Payments, 12 Water Resources Research 615-16 (1966); Calabresi, supra note 3.
6. The question arises as to the nature and meaning of perturbations. There appear to be two
categories of causes for such perturbations: 1) pure random events much like accidents; and 2)
forms of designed coercion. For example, if farmer A's cows enter farmer B's corn field, Coase
never analyzes why the cows entered. Did farmer A inadvertently allow entry or was it by
design, i.e., A herded them close to the field so the cows would be attracted to the corn? Most of
the literature on externalities takes it as given that the externality (or perturbation) results from
unexpected or inadvertent behavior of one party. But, again, inadvertent behavior is suggestive
that there are gaps in information. And coercion by design, other imperfections aside, cannot
occur unless at least one party has less than perfect information.
7. Mishan conjectures but does not offer a proof of this conclusion. See Mishan, The Postwar
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. Econ. Literature 1 (March 1971). Both
Dolbear and Randall have, however, demonstrated this point. See Dolbear, On the Theory of
Optimum Externality, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (1967).
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market for liability versus non-liability rules per se must be included.
Since the wealth of each individual is presumably affected by liability
or non-liability, bidding will occur as to which rule should be
adopted; the outcome of bidding for and against a liability rule will be
determined by initial endowments that are sustained by legal rules (or
by force) other than liability. Such a market may be precluded where
there is an omnipotent government (also with zero transactions costs
including enforcement costs) which decides on this rule as well as
others extraneous to individual preferences. It is hard to believe that
even Coase would accept this presumption, and yet he does not offer
an alternative in his perfect (with a perturbation) model.
If individuals with relatively large initial endowments were more
prone to be the cause of perturbations, i.e., if they could afford to
build petro-chemical factories or drive vehicles in congested, polluted
urban areas, and if there were a sufficient number of the rich, then the
bid price for the non-liability rule would be higher than the bid price
for liability.8 Alternatively, if those with relatively small initial
endowments induced more perturbations, and if their numbers were
not too large, then the bid price for liability rules would be higher.
Obviously, regardless of the rule "purchased," Pareto efficiency
would still be achieved and thereby the Coase "theorem" is valid; but
the perceived wealth and allocation of goods varies depending on 1)
initial endowment, 2) which groups in society induce more perturba-
tions, and 3) their relative numbers.
The Coase theorem, despite more than a decade of defense and
attack by economists and legal scholars, has remained the landmark
for contrasting theories on the dependence between economic
efficiency and legal rules governing liability for inadvertent or
unanticipated, acts between private citizens or industries. Hopefully,
the papers in this symposium will clarify some aspects of the debate
and simultaneously stimulate thought on needed areas of basic and
policy oriented research.
RALPH C. d'ARGE
and
The Editors
8. It should be noted that the "market" for legal rules would be identical to a market for
mixed public goods since all individuals are influenced to some degree by their alteration or
initiation. Also, the word prone is used here to denote the Coasian implicit assumption that the
perturbation or externality is not expected until it occurs but that some individuals by their
nature, i.e., raising cattle, are more likely than other individuals such as corn farmers to induce
externalities. This is presumably because cows can walk but corn cannot.
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